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EXAMINATION OF PURPOSES FOR VATER PRICIN'

These lectures will

-rights- to water

year.

What

is

that

at

not deal with Riparian situations.

precludes

stake

is

interested in the facilities

is needed.

whether

not

We assume some

bidding or auctioning of use rights

the

use

of water

itself;

necessary to store and convey

we

are

each

also

it to where

it

How far.ers utilize water might be expected to depend merely on

they

pay

anth1ng

for

it.

The

til1ling

of

when

payaents

are

calculated aay not be very influential.

1.

There will a 1 ways be some revenue co 11 ected in some form, because there

is a continuing need to pay operating and .a1ntenance charges.

2.

a.

Sometimes these payments are in kind and not

in cash.

b.

Fulfilling this need does not have to involve the State.

The only other reasons for collections by-the··· State

general

revenues,

recover

costs

of

facilities,

regulate

.~

res 0 u r c e s("

~n d

reg u 1 ate use

0

~:

obtain

use

of

~en

p r 1 vat ely

revenue purposes mayor may not

influence

f a wa t err e sou r c e t hat h a

appropriated.

3.

The above reasons are all

a.

Collections

interconnected.

for general

planning. construction. efficient use. and cost recovery of new

As

facilities.

far

collections lIIade

to general

b.

as

long-run

resource

allocation

is

concerned.

to recover cost of facilities lIIay or Inay not add

revenues.

Collections,

for

general~.

will

always affect rate of use

This is because the price acts as a

of resources in the short run.

tax, and this tends to cutback usage.

If the levy is lIade at the

start of the irrigation season. the amount of revenue coll ected

will

be a function of the slope of the demand curve for water (not

precisely accurate) at the start of the season.

Water demand

storage

by

However,

or

in

river

flows

the individual

season will

will

be

cutback

charges.

water units actually taken during the

be treated as though they are free and that the cost of

purchasing them have already been incurred.

units

such

from

of water delivered

throughout

If the levy is made on

the season.

cutback on use in certain parts of the season.

always add to the general

there may be some

Collections will

revenue.

A water tax lIIight generate considerable revenue and create some

water ·savings· that can be used

to supply other farmers--probable

sup P 1 1 esc a n b e s w1 t c h e dar o·u n d - - but h a v e sma 1 1 e f f e c ton

usage during a season,

since the cost by

as

is

sunk.

If the

tax

high

enough,

the",selves back to where expected

that time will

be treated

water demanders

deliveries will

less than expected consumptive use by the crops.

act u a 1

will

be equal

cut

to or

Users may switch

to sprinklers (divert loss water) or they ",ay agree to pay the tax

while bringing Inore

c.

Revenue collections

land in under a different ",ode of irrigation.

could

be

justified

for

the

saine

reasons

that

land taxes are justified--certain persons in society are in control

of certain production assets

Property has often been taxed,

that

are

ilnportant

to

everybody.

and sOlne form of rights to water

availability could be treated as property.

S1m1larly,;f

rented from the State water could be, too.

Water taxes might not

be too hard to collect,

land

is

because user groups are often 1nvol ved and

may operate as the collection agent.

d.

Collections could be made to recover costs of

for

any

investment

always

causes

some

facilities.

confusion.

The

Paying

first

consideration is the time period before any resources are committed

to

the

investment.

During this

period,

risk and

potential

payoffs

are

assu~ed,

and benefit/cost ratios are calculated based upon

expected selling prices of the proposed production.

In the private

sector, if all goes well, the investors will meet expenses, recover

capital

with

interest,

and

earn

additional

profit--if

lucky.

In

this -ease, the may roll their capital over into another round of

investment.

If they are unlucky, they lose capital or bankrupt and

are driven out of the industry.

In otherwords, they cover their

capital costs until all their invested capital wears out •

. As we have seen earlier, many issues are involved when public sources

are to be committed:

What are the arguments for the investment?

How did a

lsi t

particular irrigation design get proposed in the first place?
adequate?

What

is

to

be

the

rol e of

subsidy?

Society

can

define

efficiency anJway it pleases--and if it chooses to provide a lot of subsidy

by not charging

for

facilities,

there

is

nothing

decision other than failure to recognize that someone,

inmoral

about

that

somewhere will

have

to bear to cost of subsidy.

Once a decision

has been made

certain type of reasoning app 1 ies:

may be expected to cover full

to recover costs of faci l1ties,

the schedule of charges to be

a

levied

costs to society or recover those costs

society says

~ust

pri vate firm (add

be recovered.

in

Let us see how recovery

the differences made by

Once a facility

~onopol

viewed

in -

ies).

has been built we move into the time period after the

resources have been co .... itted and into the period of sunk

havee seen in the private case,

d~es

if planned de .. and

firm does the best it can to cover variable costs

of fixed

is

costs possible.

The firm does

costs.

As we

not materialize, the

and recover any portion

this by accepting any prices above

average variable cost and produces where price • marginal cost.!..!:., if it

can

control

cos ·t

1.

price,

are all

it

cutsback

until

the

new .. arginal

revenue • marginal

coverd (as in Jlonopo ly).

A public entity with lack of demand cannot do quite the same thing.

While it tends to have monopoly (price setting) power,

output

to

be

where price •

as

though

~arginal

there were

co~petition.

This

cost.

is

due

to

sunk costs and society's opportunity cost.

Thi s

the

it would prefer

wou 1 d put output

relationship

between

If society's sunk costs

cannot be recovered, the best use of resources is to cover variable

costs

as well

are very

as possible.

In

so~e

extreme cases,

the

low or nil--the use of a bridge or railroad

variable costs

tunnel

might not

cost

society

anything

once

the

opportunity cost to society is

in order to encourage use.

resources

low or zero.

are

committed.

1 f t he

prices should be the same

This is the philisophical foundation for

lI'Iarginal-cost pricing.

z.

If the free use of the facility is so great that it becoll'les congested.

individual

.. arginal

social

begin to rise.

costs rise even faster.

facility requires a toll

but

it can be shown

that

the

and that efficient use of the

to be levied on use equal

to the difference

"between marginal and average social costs.

The conveyance facilities of our irrigation systems are somewhat

like

a footbridge or a railroad tunnel; there is a lI'Iaximum amount that can flow.
given the pipe or cannal dimensions and the water level. *

In sOlie cases storage may seem excessi yet even to protect against

drouth,

and observers lI'Iay think that prices should be lowered in order to

utilize lI'Iore water.

However. the governing criteria is how much mwater can

be put through the sll'lal lest part of the system--where the maximum value is

aChieved,

prices are low enough.

Further lowering will

not encourage more

* Where 1Ad~vidwll decisions are controlling -flow,- the congestion can
become so great as to cause total stoppage.

throughput even if actua 1 lIarginal

costs (opportunity costs) are

lower.

By

the same token, there is no autol1atic guarantee that raising prices will

cut the flow, at least up to some point.

Generally, this max1l1um thoughput

will be achieved very quickly as the project stages up to full-land and

water utilization.

Thus, the most genreal rule is that manipulation of

·water prices· caRnet affect the efficiency of conveyance facility use

since the fa-c1lity runs at capacity and the farl1ers are not on a del1and

systell.

When there is space in the systel1,

it is because water is being

deliberately held back--(dall) or the streall source has fallen in volulle.

A demand systel1 is analagous to purchasing electr1c1ty--the users only

purchase varying amounts when and if they choose.

utilized

1nvol ved:

thus,

for home consumption

is on demand

In

the U.S.A.,

systems.

the water

Two features

are

1) the usage is metered and 2) dellland tends to COlne in peaks;

capacity (storage and deli very) must be adequate to serv ice the peak

loads--at all other times the system has underuti lized capacity.

The classic efficiency problem and

finance such a system, is well

switch use to nonpeak periods.

known.

This

its

solution,

when

users must

The problelll is to entice users to

is sol ved by marginal-cost pricing, in

other words, lowering tariffs to encourage uti 11zat1on.

cost

pricing

does

not

cover capital

costs

However, marg1nal-

under such circumstances;

equ1p.ent wears out, and there is no real division for depreciation or

interest return on invested capital.

To solve th1s last problem, a lump-

Th1s payment can

su. pay.ent 1s required of users . who j01n the system.
take the form of a meter charge, a ·hook-up· fee, etc.

The result1ng structure composed of a lu.p su. to cover 1mportant

capital costs, plus a slid1ng fee related to marginal costs of measured use

at

certa1n

periods,

is

call ed

a two-part

tari ff.

[Note

that

it

1s

underut111zed capacity that creates a s1tuation where additional use can be

obtained at low or zero social opportunity cost.]

Obv10usly, the typ1cal irrigat10n system 1s not a demand system--a

demand system may be a necess1ty in electrical,

natural gas,

or other

public ut111ty de11very serv1ces, but it is a luxury 1n 1rrigation.

A road that requ1res toll s to reduce congest10n w111

earn rents that

1n the pr1vate world are the ·green light- to further development.

Once

* The definition of economic efficiency is that as long as social
opporun1ty costs are below what people are wi 1 ling to pay--output should be
expanded by lowering price.

the

rents

additional

are

being

road

interpreted

as

1 flo w.

Hex t, a new r

0

effective demand

Current ly,

the

toll

for

is

ad 1 s b u 1 1 t par all e 1 tot he old.

Congestion

fa 11 s off;

is no need, on efficiency grounds, to set such h1-gh toll.

In fact, a

roads

there

0

and

a pecu liar thing happens.

space,

too h 1 g h to con t r

Two

obtained

are

now available to

handle

the

demand.

high toll does not generate any revenue since people switch back to the

low

cost original

for

road which is now uncongested.

The new low,

or no toll,

the two roads, set according to the social opportunity cost of ayerage

traYel,

will

not generate enough money to pay for

the new road.

There is

surplus capacity, and, again, the way out is a two-part tariff. *

In the case of a full

the source will

cannal, as we haye seen, the flow is as full

There is no necessary connection between revenues

permit.

c h a r g e d an d e f fe c t i v e de 1ft and; rev e n u e s

II

a y or

indicators of need for further development.

impossible

facility

can

is

due

to

the

1ft

a y no t b e 1 n t e r pre ted as

Further development Iftay be

size or availability of the source.

technically

be attempted

as

feasible

and

runs

in whatever way seems most

* The cap 1 tal c h a r g e s

at

capacity,

If a parallel

recovery of costs

reasonable and equitable.*

If

lit 1 g h t bel e vie don c e per yea r up and r i v e r s wh 0
habitually utilize the roads during peak or congested hours.

the

facil ity

has

genuine

excess

capacity.

a two-part

tariff might work to

encourage more use of the facilities.

1.

Efficieny of use at farm level

efficiency go up.

cannot use charges to make facility

The question now is, whether charges can make the

on-farM level efficiency of use rise?

final

This is

consumers' consuAlpt1on of electricity

like asking whether the

is wasteful.

In

this

w.e argue that they can use what they paid for as thye pleases.

farMers

'0

are concerned, we cannot say that,

because we want to

u t put and to use deli v ere d wa t era s we 1 1 asp 0 s sib 1 e.

into

a

potential

contr1d1ct1on,

in

that,

to

obtain

case,

Where

increase

Her ewe run

efficient

conveyance-system usage we lower prices to social opportunity cost

1 eve 1 sin

yet,

0

r de r t

0

cur b was teo nth e far m.

we want higher unit pricesl*

Luck11y,

as we have seen,

with prices won't affect system use efficiency; so,

with

and,

We want higher

all

fiddling

we are

left

is on-farm water use efficiency.

* However, the congested road is on ly possil be because the ·source- of
the flow can be made larger or smaller by "i ndividual decisions of whether
or not to travel froll A to B.
A water source is a constant (except for low
flow times) on a river systell and the roal (pipe) is sized to handle its
invaried output.
This is one way the road or tunnel analogy breaks down.

Efficient use is technically defined according to consumptive use

requirements

of crops.

Crops can only utilize so much water.

-adequate-

or

-over-adequate,-

any

excess

If the amount available is

percu lates

to

underground

aquifers or returns to some river system where other irrigators can use it.

If More -efficient- irrigation is practiced, for whatever reason,

this

.eans less water is diverted and restdull used elsewhere (more rapidly than

when

waiting

irrigated

for

with

the

it

to

same

appear

type

.!!!'

if any,

foregone

for some reasons,

finance

an

reduction

or

.ore

land

of overland

is

return

the

potential

gains

are measured

if water is ·wastefu lly- app lied

by

in one

the

area,

the overland return is not used elsewhere.

Excepting such special

help

and

return)

Raising water prices might have an effect on

of ·efficiency,· (where

production,

overland

amount of water

and irrigated land elsewhere.

this

via

cases,

on-going project,

the collection of increased charges may

or

even

raise

general

revenue,

but

the

* When American public utilities and government leaders called for
American to ·conserve- energy usage, the natural excess capcity of the
energy delivery systems was effectively increased.
Revenues fell and the
companies asked for rate increases to cover capital costs.
As a result,
individual attained a redu~ed amount of electricity or natural gas for the
same or more money.
Not all the cutbacks were a response to higher prices;
of course, a cycle of raising prices and cutting consumption is selfreinforcing.

collective will

production.

have

little or no meaning in

of increasing net

ter~s

It might be supposed that designed capacities are not adequate

to satisfy comsumptive use requirements.

This

is a common situation.

Farmers do not have enough water and must decide whether to short all

crops

or leave some land unp lanted in order to concentrate more water to less

space.

This decision automatically forces famres to make an efficiency of

water-use decision.

will

In a water-short situation,

a system of water charges

not effect efficiency of use one way or another.

to c ·o ntrol.

If a system of charges

is overlaid

There is no ·waste·

on

top of inadequate

supplies the goal can only be to tax for general revenue.

Payments will

be

res 1 s ted or w11 1 h a v e to be set at 1 eve 1 S co 11m ens era t e wit h pro f 1 tab 11 1 t y

situation of the farmers.

level

of charge

At the same time, it must be realized that any

that actually reduces

levels of

use below what would be

justified by society's opportunity cost is too high.

This

reinforces

the general

and the efficiency goal

opporating

may fail

costs are

observation that fees

of benefiting

fro~

sunk

low may be l1utally exclusive.

to account for is that a ·well

to collect revenue

costs where

society's

What project planners

designed- surface project will

throw-off water which will be used elsewhere, outside the project, as

suppl iMent or for

The only way this won't occur is

new land.

project is designed for sprink lers in the first place.

use would not be an issue.

drainage

w1de

terms--not

respons1b1l1t1es.

and cause farlllers

if the

Then efficiency of

Planners should view on farm efficiency in

li1111ted

to

If project planners

the

feel

to be lIore -eff1c1ent-,

spec1fic

project

project

farlllers

of

the1r

are wastefu 1

e1ther lIore land will

be opened

up 1n the project (clos1ng down land outs1de) or lower d1vers10ns w1l 1 move

more water quickly to downstream users.

Fees can be set to cover project costs or obtain revenues 1n a lIanner

appropr1ate to the s1tuat10n.

The charges, 1f general, w11l create the

general

il1pact of any tax, cut product10n,and ra1se pr1ces to a greater or

lesser

degree.

Spec1f1c

benef1c1ar1es can be

annaul

paYllents.

charges

lev1ed

on

p~rt1cular

projects

lev1ed on a lump-sum bas1s by sett1ng contracts w1th

In some cases,

account 1s taken of the cubic meters

de11vered and a charge/unit is collected.

charges lIIay affect lIIarginal costs, and,

As mentioned earlier, these

therefore, cutback individual

consumption (the residual will be used elsewhere and mayor may not be

subject to the special fees to recover project costs).

In sUllllaary, the general situation is that fiddling prices will not

effect efficiency of conveyance faci lity; the process will

global

drainage

adequate,

and,

production

if

they

are

at

the

far ..

adequate,

level

if water

scarcity

will

not affect

supplies

create

its

are

own

efficiency.

The previous

few paragraphs generally apply to irrigation in the

private sector.

s uc h
be

f a-c i lit i e s '" a y

repaid

in

facilities

order

are

to

quite

0

r

1ft a y

prevent

old

and

appreciable nature on society,

the III.

Thus,

from

not rep res en t cap ita l i n v est men t s t hat .. us t

financial

their

use

losses.

1l11poses

no

Hore

likely,

social

cost

the

of an

and their owners have had -good- use of

either a private or public standpoint,

the more the

facilities are used the better.

Obviously,

it

is possible,

in some cases,

that lIIore water

and applied to crops than consumptive use requires.

represents wasteful

use depends

Again, whether this

upon the hydrology of the total

what use is made of return flows by other irrigators.

is diverted

system and

As we have seen, a

system of charges maya 1 ter techno logy and bring in more 1 and or cutback

d 1 v e r s ion sin

ace r t a 1 n are a.

of a drainage,

either

less land irrigated.

Depending on

response will

the entire

irrigation pattern

trigger downstreal1 impact observed as

The salle amount or . sl1ght expansion of land all

depended upon how lIuch water actua lly reaches them and how they in term

react to the tax.

The More general

d1 vert ·excess· water,

users feel

by

is

guaranteed

to do the best it can.

by

techniques will

that existing water systells do not

they tend to streach a 11

that they need additional

~hortage

begins to

situation

phys1ca 1

shortage.

be introduced if

water.

The user group is constrained

Again,

Fees

the crops

the water they can get and

efficiency of water

simply

are

raise

such

since

revenue.

valuable and

if

is

New

the water

cos.t some money.

Water charges may be levied as public leaders see fit,

for

use

levies would mostly

neither

efficiency nor

turn

on

desires

system cost

to

recovery

collect

is at

but the reasons

general

stalee.

revenue

Reasoning

based upon argullents of achieving greater efficiency in resource use, as we

have seen, are unlikely to be valid except in special

situations where the

I
I

I
downstream hydrology is such as to prevent reuse or there are no downstream

users,

etc.

The

irony of these special

situations

is that

it malees no

I

I
!

-I

I

!

I

I

I

difference if water

cares?

is ·wasted· or not;

if there is no further

use who

The hydrologic cycle will replace it next year or some ·excess·

!light be held in storage if the system includes the requisite faci lities.

Water-use

efficiency

froll underground

or

in

private

river sources

consumptive needs of the crop.

if pUllping costs are

(when

in

doubt

very

in

based

controlled

on

by

individual

pumping

pUll'lping

costs

vs.

the

The only way too much water will be used is

low and water

use more water) or

amount and tilling of water needed by

1.

systell'ls

is ·substituted· for

if a lIistake

in lIade

other

inputs

in judging the

the crops.

The pricing structure probably lI'Iust be controlled

by any decisions to

recover some system costs.

The pricing situation probably will not

affect

and

systell'l

efficiency

efficiency basin-wide systems

gi ven

a.

probably

although

will

it might

not

affect

on

affect water

use

farm

on

a

project.

Efficiency

in

facility

use

mayor

lIIay

not

be

harmonious

cOll'lsull'lptive needs of crops.

Harginal

users would move 1I0re water

through the system.

cost pricing of facility

treat water as the cheapest 1nput(and create a

return).

No general

with

Farmers might

lot of overland

effect on basin-wide efficiency.

2.

Whether pricing can effect efficient use of facility depends on whether

or not they run at capacity.

3.

Wheter pricing can affect overall

eff1cent use at the farm level

depends on particular and possibly unillportnat situations, i.e., no

reuse (if no reuse, who clres).

As long as wlter is reused,

it is

If it cannot be reused, due to under

stretched to achieve efficiency.

supply, what ever is possible It any point in the systell is achieved

all down the line.

4.

Water

charges

alternative

may

s1l1p ly

be

asorbed

in crops and

if

supp lies

are

tight.

are Ivaillble, the charge lilY

force a search for higher yield through changed technique.

charges sillply shift use sOllewhere else.

ina • Ide qUI t e • sur f ace s y s' t e In t e c h n 1 que

If

otherwise

If they are high enough, even

II

a y c han g e ,

and t his w11 l ' be

in use shifts.

If less is diverted. downstreall users lIay Ictual ly hive

water,

since lower upstream run-o ff Illy lIean 1 ess percu 1 ates

MOFe

into the

Iguifer.

5.

Recovery of the construction costs of large public works costs are

often thought to be unharmonious with their effective uti l1zation. once

costs are sunk.

However. in the irrigation case. costs allocated to

farl1ers for co 11 ection l1ay be co 11 ected in many cases without reguard

for efficiency il1pacts upon the conveyance system or at the farm level.

We have talked about efficiency in water use or managel1ent.

Thus far.

we have concentrated on efficiency in utilization of the conveyance systel1

other concepts of the effeciency are certainly

and at the farlft level.

involved.

P h y sic a 1

such as.

.a nag e 1ft en t

the overall

0

hydropower generation.

f

engineering concepts or possibly the

t .h e s t 0 rag e

fa c i 1 i tie s

0r

coo din a t ion

wit h

In addition. there is also the notion of being able

to shift and 110ve water between systems and over

large areas according to

changing agricultural needs or possibly other nonagricultural needs.

In

the

attention.

Western

U.S.A •• this

question

has

because economic development has tended

received

considerable

to reduce the need for

agricultural water and increase the del1and for municipal and individual

supp lies.

This alteration in the structure of water demand would not

create any problems except for the fact that the flows or avai labi 1 ities of

most

water

sources

have

been

appropriated

by public

or pri vate entities.

Thus,

in order to satisfy a new demand,

there must be a redefinition of the

terms of existing water rights or the rights must be transferable.*

But transfers must be approved because shifting diversion points have

il1pacts on other users and potential conflicts must be resolved.

·ri ghts· do not trade at will

in

the Market.

Thus,

In ear l1er t1l11es, of course,

the appropriation doctrine .1ght have been looked upon as a deliberate

l1ethod to rel10ve a vital resource frOM the norl1al

workings of the .arket in

the nal1e of equity.

Nowadays,

look

uses

the

idea is that people or institutions who need water will

towards agriculture for a low cost supply that can be transferred to

upon

which

transfer unduely

society

is,

places

therefore,

higher

values.

The

system that restricts

inefficient. *

One of the most difficult real-world problems in irrigation water

utilization is encountered

in many ·unstructured· situations;

users

at

the

* There is some scope for appropriating additional water if winter runoff can be utilized.
Control of winter run-off,
year, requires adequate and costly storage.

so it can be utilized all

*In societies that do not grant -rights· they can 110ve water at wil 1-on paper. In practice, they have to be careful.
In practice, they have all
the problems of ba lancing water uses, quantity, and qua lity concerns that
the U.S.A. has.
They are forced to set ru les by which command decisions
Some rules may be codified in water law.
can be made.

head

of

the

ditch

get

lI'Iore

water

than

those

at

the

end.

observation is that the farmers have all'lple or ·excess· water,

not ha ve enough.

or another,

In other situations this never happens,

A common

the

latter do

because, one way

control s are 1l1'1p 0 sed to present such practice.

What role can imposition of fees play in exercising such control?

To control water use at the head of a ditch with a lump-sum payment

would require special

charges on head and

users.

The result would be two

types of payments or water-fee collections alllong the saMe user groups.

add '1 t ion,

as

we

ha v e

irrigation season,

annua 1 production.

the season.

all

see n ,

1 u mp - sum

Once paid,

A strong

at

say

physical

it would not effect the

Monltoring

the

s tar t

system would

level

be

0

f

ea ch

cost

of

of use during

required during

If fees are imposed on the basis of units of wat~r

those who use the IIIOSt will

be to cause water used to be cutback.

d itch for other

t a x,

would be treated by the farll'lers as a fixed

irrigation periods.

de li vered,

a

In

pay the

1110

st,

and the effect shou 1 d

Thus, more water will

stay in the

users. *

Again, the unit measurement must be checked on or enforced and fees

collected.

the case,

These lIust be on the basis of human supervision.

That being

equity in water use anywhere in the system can be control led

direct ly by inspection of ·d1tch riders·, no fees are necessary to sol ve

the head-end/ta11-end problem.

r e cog nit 1 on 0 f

purpose

for

In fact equity will

the con t r 0 1 s n e c e s sa r y to

fees

could

construction costs or

f~r

be

only be served by

11 ve 1 n a co 1 1 e c t 1 v e.

concentrated

upon

repayment

The p r 111'1 e

of

system

other purposes.

Extra heavy water use at the head-end of a ditch cannot be sol ved by

charging for water.

Unless,

the actual water entering the farm headgate a

can be .elsured and recorded.·

Otherwise,

hu.an .0n1tor1ng and control

is

required.

* Water lI'Ieters

are designed into
development in the Hajes Project, Peru.

the

planned

on-farll'l

sprinkler

